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Late in the evening of September 1 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order that
many critics have described as effectively overruling Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision
holding that the U.S. Constitution protected a woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion. That description, though technically inaccurate, does capture something
important about the Court’s order: It made abortions unavailable as a practical matter
for many women in Texas who would have had access to abortion services had the
Court issued a different order.
Undue burden
First, what is the relevant law? Texas adopted a statute known as SB8 prohibiting
abortions after a fetal heartbeat can be detected, which is roughly at six weeks
after conception. Under existing constitutional doctrine, SB8 is almost certainly
unconstitutional. (a) The rule stated by Roe v. Wade is that prohibiting abortion
until some much later time – sixteen to twenty weeks after conception – is
unconstitutional. (b) That rule was modified in 1993 in the Casey decision to make
unconstitutional laws that impose “undue burdens” on a woman’s right to choose.
(The Casey decision did say that it preserved the “core holding” of Roe v. Wade,
which it described as a rule barring complete prohibitions on early-term abortions.)
Because a large number of women don’t know that they are pregnant at the six-week
mark because, for example, their menstrual periods are irregular, or are unable to
bring themselves to make a decision to have an abortion in the relatively short period
between their becoming aware, usually after four weeks, that they might be pregnant
and the time when a fetal heartbeat can be detected, SB8 almost certainly imposes
an undue burden on the right to choose.
The applicable constitutional law, though, isn’t as clear as that – not because
we don’t know what Roe and Casey imply for SB8, but because the Supreme
Court’s present majority has indicated rather strongly their disagreement with Roe
and, somewhat less so, with Casey. And the Court will hear argument in the next
months in a case where the state of Mississippi has expressly asked it to overrule
Roe and its progeny, including Casey. Most observers believe, with good reason,
that somewhere between three and six justices will accept that invitation. The
consequence is, as law professor Michael Dorf has put it, that no responsible lawyer
could advise an abortion provider in Texas that it can continue to offer abortions to
women after six weeks, confident that SB8 would be held unconstitutional.
That matters because of the second important feature of SB8. Ordinarily a ban on
abortions would be enforced by state officials, usually prosecutors who file criminal
charges against violators. SB8 doesn’t do that. Instead it authorizes any citizen to file
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a civil complaint against an abortion provider who violates SB8, which if successful
will result in a $10,000 fine and other penalties against the (civil) defendant.
Ex parte Young
The U.S. Supreme Court order involved a challenge to the substantive provisions
of SB8, but dealt solely with the implications of this enforcement mechanism. In
many European constitutional systems the route to challenging a bill like SB8 would
be simple: Legislators would file an ex ante or “abstract review” challenge to the
bill in the constitutional court. The U.S. system is different because it requires a
“case or controversy” – essentially, what in other nations is called something like a
“constitutional complaint” arising in ordinary litigation – as the vehicle for a challenge.
One major form of this is that a defendant charged with violating a criminal statute
can raise the statute’s unconstitutionality as a defense in the criminal proceeding.
The procedural rules for constitutional challenges in the United States do allow for
something quite similar to an ex ante challenge that works in many cases. Here
the details matter. The mechanism for such challenges, known as an Ex parte
Young lawsuit, is this: A potential defendant in a criminal or civil action brought
by a state official seeks an injunction in federal court against enforcing the statute
on the ground that it is unconstitutional (or seeks a declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional). The requisite “case or controversy” arises because, the defendant
alleges, it will suffer “irreparable harm” from the mere existence of the statute, harm
that can’t be eliminated by waiting for the prosecutor to bring criminal charges and
asserting the statute’s unconstitutionality as a defense. The reason is that the threat
of criminal liability – and in particular the size of the threatened penalties – is so large
that no potential defendant would take the risk of violating the statute, anticipating
that the constitutional challenge will provide it with a successful defense. (Note
here the relevance of Professor Dorf’s point about what a responsible lawyer would
advise an abortion provider client.) The target of the regulation stops doing what it
wants to do and no criminal action is actually ever brought.
There’s a final wrinkle. The Court has held that a potential defendant can’t bring
an Ex parte Young lawsuit when the prosecutor either (a) expressly disclaims
any intent to enforce the statute or (b) expressly asserts that it will bring a single
enforcement action in which the statute’s constitutionality can be determined (and
will not prosecute “violations” that occur between the time this single lawsuit is filed
and a final court decision upholding the statute’s constitutionality). But, the Court
has also held, in the absence of such a disclaimer the courts should assume that the
prosecutor will enforce the statute.
With all that as background, here’s what happened leading up to the Supreme
Court’s order. Texas abortion providers filed an Ex parte Young action against
a number of state judges, court officials, and one anti-abortion activist, asking
for injunctive and declarator relief. The judges were to be enjoined from moving
forward with any civil actions that were filed under SB8, the court officials were to
be enjoined from accepting papers purporting to institute such civil actions, and
the activist was to be enjoined from bringing a civil action. The activist-defendant,
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though, filed papers asserting that he had no intention of filing any such action – the
equivalent of the prosecutor’s disclaimer already mentioned.
The federal trial judge who had the case held an extensive hearing and ultimately
decided that the abortion providers’ case could move forward, effectively preventing
SB8 from going into effect. The various defendants sought and received a stay of
that decision from the intermediate appellate court, putting the litigation on hold
and potentially allowing SB8 to take effect in the interim. The abortion providers in
turn asked the U.S. for one of two remedies: an injunction against enforcement of
SB8 until the underlying litigation was finally concluded, or an order vacating the
intermediate court’s stay, with the effect of reinstating the trial court’s decision that
blocked SB8’s enforcement.
The U.S. Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, refused to provide either form of
relief. While noting that the constitutional challenge to SB8 was a serious (potentially
valid) one, the Court’s order observed that the procedural complexities of the case
– whether Ex parte Young cases could be brought against these defendants –
meant that the abortion providers could not show that they were likely to succeed
in the underlying litigation — not, again, because they were wrong about SB8’s
constitutionality but because the courts might ultimately decide that they hadn’t used
the right mechanism to bring the challenge.
Rattling around in the discussion of SB8 is a misleading concern about whether the
private civil action would be “state action” subject to the relevant provisions of the
U.S. Constitution. The answer to that is clear: If the state law authorizing the civil
action is substantively unconstitutional – violates Roe v. Wade or imposes an undue
burden – then a civil action to enforce the law triggers the Constitution. (That’s the
only way to understand why civil actions seeking damages for allegedly libelous
statements are subject to constitutional requirement.)
Ways forward
Third, what does the Court’s action mean? (1) Although the order has no direct
implications for Roe v. Wade (even as a signal that five justices are ready to overrule
Roe), it does mean that abortions are now effectively unavailable to a large number
of women in Texas because abortion providers have responded, as could have been
expected, to the in terrorem threat of large fines by declining to provide abortions
covered by SB8’s prohibition.
(2) Are there other ways to challenge SB8? Of course if some Texas citizen brings
a civil action in a Texas state court against an abortion provider that provider can
assert SB8’s unconstitutionality as a defense. Depending upon Texas’s procedural
rules the provider might be able to get an expedited hearing on the validity of the
defense, and perhaps even some sort of stay of further proceedings against it while
this single action is pending. Ordinarily that wouldn’t help other abortion providers,
but there’s a (slim) possibility that the Texas courts would somehow figure out a way
to use a single SB8 action as a vehicle for insulating other abortion providers from
liability until SB8’s constitutionality is finally decided.
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And there’s yet another wrinkle. Ordinarily federal courts can’t enjoin pending
state criminal or civil proceedings. But there’s a rarely-invoked and quite narrow
exception to that rule: A federal court can enjoin a pending state proceeding if the
statute authorizing the proceeding is “flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Perhaps SB8 fits
that description (though I wouldn’t be confident about that conclusion). If so, once a
state civil action under SB8 is filed, the abortion provider can go back to federal court
to get an injunction against the civil action.
Finally, perhaps abortion providers can try again with a slightly different Ex parte
Young action, this one against twenty or thirty anti-abortion activists. The U.S.
Supreme Court order noted that “the sole private-citizen respondent” had “no present
intention to enforce the law.” With twenty or thirty such respondents it seems likely
that at least one will not expressly disclaim such an intention, in which case perhaps
the federal action could go forward.
(3) Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent directed attention to what’s come to be known
as the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” – decisions rendered in cases seeking
emergency relief, decided under extremely tight time lines and with quite limited
briefings. The shadow docket has existed for decades, but it exploded under the
Trump administration, which routinely sought the Supreme Court’s immediate
assistance when its initiatives were blocked by lower courts staffed by judges
appointed by prior presidents. And the Court seemed systematically to go along:
Statistics on the shadow docket show that the modern shadow docket decisions
on matters of real importance favor conservative interests. The Biden Commission
on Supreme Court reform has taken under advisement issues associated with the
shadow docket, though it’s quite difficult to figure out what, other than exhortation to
be more careful and to act less precipitously, can be done about the docket.
(4) Finally, on the issue of “Court reform” (expansion, Court-packing): The SB8 order
seems likely to feed into the narrative advocates for Court reform have developed –
a Court “out of control,” or “unbalanced,” or “radically conservative and out of tune
with the American people.” The prospects for serious Court reform were never large,
and the SB8 order probably won’t make it likely in the short run. But, the narrative
fueling proposals for Court reform has had surprising staying power, and Court
reform might eventually take place. (For what it’s worth: New Dealers were taking
about the possibility of Court-packing as early as 1933, four years before FDR’s
Court-packing plan became the focus of heated political contention.)
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